相关论文: Remote Estimation Games with Random Walk Processes…
Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…
This paper considers the remote state estimation in a cyber-physical system (CPS) using multiple sensors. The measurements of each sensor are transmitted to a remote estimator over a shared channel, where simultaneous transmissions from…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
To protect the systems exposed to the Internet against attacks, a security system with the capability to engage with the attacker is needed. There have been attempts to model the engagement/interactions between users, both benign and…
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…
This study presents a numerical analysis framework for pursuit--evasion differential games under the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Semi-DCNLP method is introduced as an optimization solver for flight path optimization problems formulated…
Risk measures are commonly used to capture the risk preferences of decision-makers (DMs). The decisions of DMs can be nudged or manipulated when their risk preferences are influenced by factors such as the availability of information about…
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…
Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern…
Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…
We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…
The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint and model the actor and critic interaction…
Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in cyber crimes and system failures caused by misinformation. Many of these instances can be classified as gaslighting, which involves manipulating the perceptions of others through the use…
We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…
This paper studies a stochastic robotic surveillance problem where a mobile robot moves randomly on a graph to capture a potential intruder that strategically attacks a location on the graph. The intruder is assumed to be omniscient: it…
There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increasing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilibrium computation is an important research problem. While prior…