相关论文: Inception: Efficiently Computable Misinformation A…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

Adversarial attacks on stochastic bandits have traditionally relied on some unrealistic assumptions, such as per-round reward manipulation and unbounded perturbations, limiting their relevance to real-world systems. We propose a more…

We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

Misinformation has become a significant issue in today's society, with the proliferation of false information through various mediums such as social media and traditional news sources. The rapid spread of misinformation has made it…

Deception plays a key role in adversarial or strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and survival. This paper introduces a general framework and solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for deception consider…

The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…

This paper investigates backdoor attack planning in stochastic control systems modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). A backdoor attack involves an adversary deploying a policy that performs well in the original MDP to pass testing,…

Conventional reinforcement learning methods for Markov decision processes rely on weakly-guided, stochastic searches to drive the learning process. It can therefore be difficult to predict what agent behaviors might emerge. In this paper,…

In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…

Desensitization addresses safe optimal planning under parametric uncertainties by providing sensitivity function-based risk estimates. This paper expands upon the existing work on desensitization in optimal control to address safe planning…

We present a method for active inference with partial observations in stochastic systems through incentive design, also known as the leader-follower game. Consider a leader agent who aims to infer a follower agent's type given a finite set…

We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…

This paper combines data-driven and model-driven methods for real-time misinformation detection. Our algorithm, named QuickStop, is an optimal stopping algorithm based on a probabilistic information spreading model obtained from labeled…

In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…

We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…

Optimal policies in standard MDPs can be obtained using either value iteration or policy iteration. However, in the case of zero-sum Markov games, there is no efficient policy iteration algorithm; e.g., it has been shown that one has to…

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…