相关论文: Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Au…

We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…

The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market -- e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets -- is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads…

This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…

We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. We show that, in the case when both the seller and the buyer…

Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…

A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…

We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this setting, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market.…

We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications in online adword markets and revenue optimization…

In this paper, a mathematical negotiation mechanism is designed to minimize the negotiators' costs in a distributed procurement problem at two echelons of an automotive supply chain. The buyer's costs are procurement cost and shortage…

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always…

Auto-bidding has become a cornerstone of modern online advertising platforms, enabling many advertisers to automate bidding at scale and optimize campaign performance. However, prevailing industrial systems rely on single-agent auto-bidding…

We consider price competition among multiple sellers over a selling horizon of $T$ periods. In each period, sellers simultaneously offer their prices (which are made public) and subsequently observe their respective demand (not made…

This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles…

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact…

We study mixed bundling and competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs) in a duopoly selling complementary products to heterogeneous customers. One retailer offers mixed bundling while the rival sells only a bundle. We characterize unique…

As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…

We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who…

Agents (specially humans) with smart devices are stemming with astounding rapidity and that may play a big role in information and communication technology apart from being used only as a mere calling devices. Inculcating the power of smart…

Double auctions are widely used in financial markets, such as those for stocks, derivatives, currencies, and commodities, to match demand and supply. Once all buyers and sellers have placed their trade requests, the exchange determines how…