相关论文: Towards Efficient Verification of Constant-Time Cr…
Recent work has shown that Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation can introduce timing side-channels to constant-time programs, which would otherwise be a principled and effective means to counter timing attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel…
Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools using taint analysis are widely viewed as providing higher-quality vulnerability detection results compared to traditional pattern-based approaches. However, performing static taint analysis…
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of…
The constant-time property is considered the security standard for cryptographic code. Code following the constant-time discipline is free from secret-dependent branches and memory accesses, and thus avoids leaking secrets through cache and…
Software vulnerabilities continue to be the primary cause of cyberattacks. It is crucial to identify vulnerabilities in applications' source code before attackers gain access to them and exploit any vulnerability they may contain.…
The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…
As quantum computing advances, quantum circuit simulators serve as critical tools to bridge the current gap caused by limited quantum hardware availability. These simulators are typically deployed on cloud platforms, where users submit…
Constant-time programming is a widely deployed approach to harden cryptographic programs against side channel attacks. However, modern processors often violate the underlying assumptions of standard constant-time policies by transiently…
The transient-execution attack Meltdown leaks sensitive information by transiently accessing inaccessible data during out-of-order execution. Although Meltdown is fixed in hardware for recent CPU generations, most currently-deployed CPUs…
Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channel information through their power supplies when implemented on a physical platform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker to extract the secret…
The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-channel leaks even in software equipped with…
Side-channel attacks are an unpredictable risk factor in cryptography. Therefore, continuous observations of physical leakages are essential to minimise vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic functions. Lightweight cryptography is a…
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such…
The rapidly evolving Node$.$js ecosystem currently includes millions of packages and is a critical part of modern software supply chains, making vulnerability detection of Node$.$js packages increasingly important. However, traditional…
Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and…
Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis to heavyweight information flow control that…
Developers rely on constant-time programming to prevent timing side-channel attacks. But these efforts can be undone by compilers, whose optimizations may silently reintroduce leaks. While recent works have measured the extent of such…
Cache side-channel attacks exhibit severe threats to software security and privacy, especially for cryptosystems. In this paper, we propose CaType, a novel refinement type-based tool for detecting cache side channels in crypto software.…
Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…