The practical issues of side-channel-secure quantum key distribution
Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and potential security loopholes at both the source and detection sides of QKD systems. The side-channel-secure (SCS) protocol addresses these challenges by encoding bits in vacuum and non-vacuum states and introducing a third-party measurement node, thereby repelling attacks targeting the detection side as well as external lab attacks on the source side. In this work, we consider the state-dependent correlated errors and Trojan-horse attack while preserving the SCS protocol's key advantage-specifically, requiring only upper bounds on intensities characterization without needing a full description of quantum states in infinite dimensions. Numerical results demonstrate that when the reflected light intensity from Trojan-horse attacks falls below , Eve can scarcely extract additional key information from the reflections. This work makes the SCS protocol more practical.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2508.15197,
title = {The practical issues of side-channel-secure quantum key distribution},
author = {Cong Jiang and Xiao-Long Hu and Zong-Wen Yu and Hai Xu and Xiang-Bin Wang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.15197},
year = {2025}
}