相关论文: Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem

We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…

Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…

We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…

Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial currency with which to purchase…

In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…

A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…

The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…

In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…

We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…

We consider the problem of repeatedly allocating multiple shareable public goods that have limited availability in an online setting without the use of money. In our setting, agents have additive values, and the value each agent receives…

This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…

Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…

In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…

Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…

Stochastic dynamic matching problems have recently gained attention in the stochastic-modeling community due to their diverse applications, such as supply-chain management and kidney exchange programs. In this paper, we study a matching…

Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…

Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…

We consider an intermediary's problem of dynamically matching demand and supply of heterogeneous types in a periodic-review fashion. More specifically, there are two disjoint sets of demand and supply types, and a reward associated with…