相关论文: Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…
A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and…
This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR),…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a wide class of economic attacks to public blockchains, where adversaries with the power to reorder, drop or insert transactions in a block can "extract" value from smart contracts. Empirical…
Designing automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets on combinatorial securities over large outcome spaces poses significant computational challenges. Prior research has primarily focused on combinatorial prediction markets…
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are decentralized exchange protocols that provide continuous access to token liquidity without the need for order books or traditional market makers. However, this innovation has failed to scale when it comes…
Within this work we consider an axiomatic framework for Automated Market Makers (AMMs). AMMs are smart contracts that set prices for swaps on a pool of assets. By imposing reasonable axioms on the underlying utility function, we are able to…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in Constant Function Market Making is fairly well understood. Does having dynamic weights, as found in liquidity boostrap pools (LBPs), Temporal-function market makers (TFMMs), and Replicating market makers…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control…
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…
We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…
Decentralised automated market makers (AMMs) have gained significant attention recently. We propose an adaptive and automated Dynamic Function Market Maker (DFMM) that addresses challenges in this space. Our DFMM protocol includes a data…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents a pivotal challenge within the Ethereum ecosystem; it impacts the fairness, security, and efficiency of both Layer 1 (L1) and Layer 2 (L2) networks. MEV arises when miners or validators manipulate…
Smart contracts led to the emergence of the decentralized finance (DeFi) marketplace within blockchain ecosystems, where diverse participants engage in financial activities. In traditional finance, there are possibilities to create values,…
Automated market makers (AMM) have grown to obtain significant market share within the cryptocurrency ecosystem, resulting in a proliferation of new products pursuing exotic strategies for horizontal differentiation. Yet, their theoretical…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a class of attacks to decentralized applications where the adversary profits by manipulating the ordering, inclusion, or exclusion of transactions in a blockchain. Decentralized Finance (DeFi)…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive on blockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulation of transaction execution order and strategic issuance of profit-generation transactions. We…
We present an automated market-making (AMM) cross-settlement mechanism for digital assets on interoperable blockchains, focusing on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and stable coins. We develop an innovative approach for generating…