相关论文: An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting R…

We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended…

Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections,…

Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce and study two time-dependent multistage models based on simple Plurality voting.…

In this paper, we study the problem of Participatory Budgeting (PB) with approval ballots, inspired by Multi-Winner Voting schemes. We present generalized preference aggregation methods for participatory budgeting, especially for finding…

We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invariant to renaming the candidates and voters, and two elections…

This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just…

This article inspects whether a multivariate distribution is different from a specified distribution or not, and it also tests the equality of two multivariate distributions. In the course of this study, a graphical tool-kit using…

Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning…

Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant…

The comparison of alternative rankings of a set of items is a general and prominent task in applied statistics. Predictor variables are ranked according to magnitude of association with an outcome, prediction models rank subjects according…

Several application domains require formal but flexible approaches to the comparison problem. Different process models that cannot be related by behavioral equivalences should be compared via a quantitative notion of similarity, which is…

Formal verification of multi-agent systems is hard, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, studies that use a single verification technique typically show limited efficiency, and allow to verify only toy examples. Here, we…

Many decision problems cannot be solved exactly and use several estimation algorithms that assign scores to the different available options. The estimation errors can have various correlations, from low (e.g. between two very different…

Statistical tests that compare classification algorithms are univariate and use a single performance measure, e.g., misclassification error, $F$ measure, AUC, and so on. In multivariate tests, comparison is done using multiple measures…

Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the…

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for…