相关论文: Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Di…
Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this…
Fractional hedonic games are coalition formation games where a player's utility is determined by the average value they assign to the members of their coalition. These games are a variation of graph hedonic games, which are a class of…
This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an…
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…
Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into $k$ coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare,…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…
We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. For this setting, we address the problem of finding divisions…
We analyze the overall benefits of an energy community cooperative game under which distributed energy resources (DER) are shared behind a regulated distribution utility meter under a general net energy metering (NEM) tariff. Two community…
This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…
A premise at a heart of network analysis is that entities in a network derive utilities from their connections. The {\em influence} of a seed set $S$ of nodes is defined as the sum over nodes $u$ of the {\em utility} of $S$ to $u$. {\em…
We consider the constrained Schelling model of social segregation in which the utility factor of agents strictly increases and non-local jumps of the agents are allowed. In the present study, the utility factor u is defined in a way such…
Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a prominent model of coalition formation where agents' preferences are derived from their individual valuations of peers. While social welfare maximization in ASHGs has traditionally focused…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
Not all real-world data are labeled, and when labels are not available, it is often costly to obtain them. Moreover, as many algorithms suffer from the curse of dimensionality, reducing the features in the data to a smaller set is often of…
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…