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Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across human societies.…
A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another…
Crime is an economically important activity, sometimes called the industry of crime. It may represent a mechanism of wealth distribution but also a social and economic charge because of the cost of the law enforcement system. Sometimes it…
Cooperation is central to the success of human societies as it is crucial for overcoming some of the most pressing social challenges of our time. Yet how human cooperation is achieved and may persist is still a main puzzle in the social and…
This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…
In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and…
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a…
The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…
Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and…
Costly punishment has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in one-shot games. However, recent studies have revealed that the effectiveness of costly punishment can be diminished by second-order free riders (i.e.,…
The interdependence between an individual strategy decision and the resulting change of environmental state is often a subtle process. Feedback-evolving games have been a prevalent framework for studying such feedback in well-mixed…
The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When cooperators engage in clusters they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected against non-cooperating individuals, which…
In the so-called ``fair'' models of peer-to-peer wealth exchanges, economic inequality tends to reach its maximum value asymptotically. This global trend is evident as the richest continuously accumulate a larger share of wealth at the…
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user…
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…
In the last years the Prisoner Dilemma (PD) has become a paradigm for the study of the emergence of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Such structure is usually assumed to be given by a graph. In general, the success of…
The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool-punishers as the three competing…
The universal prevalence of cooperation is puzzling, as defection typically yields higher payoffs than cooperation, motivating searches for hidden pathways to cooperation. Here we study a game-theoretic model on a lattice structured…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
We introduce a general contagion-like model for competing opinions that includes dynamic resistance to alternative opinions. We show that this model can describe candidate vote distributions, spatial vote correlations, and a slow approach…