相关论文: Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Dee…

In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due…

State-of-the-art drone technologies have severe flight time limitations due to weight constraints, which inevitably lead to a relatively small amount of available energy. Therefore, frequent battery replacement or recharging is necessary in…

A digital goods auction is a type of auction where potential buyers bid the maximal price that they are willing to pay for a certain item, which a seller can produce at a negligible cost and in unlimited quantity. To maximise her benefits,…

In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…

We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items.…

Periodic double auctions (PDA) have applications in many areas such as in e-commerce, intra-day equity markets, and day-ahead energy markets in smart-grids. While the trades accomplished using PDAs are worth trillions of dollars, finding a…

Peer reviewed publications are considered the gold standard in certifying and disseminating ideas that a research community considers valuable. However, we identify two major drawbacks of the current system: (1) the overwhelming demand for…

Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…

We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the problem of learning from samples the best auction in a class of "simple" auctions. Our framework captures all of the most prominent examples of "simple"…

We design fair sponsored search auctions that achieve a near-optimal tradeoff between fairness and quality. Our work builds upon the model and auction design of Chawla and Jagadeesan \cite{CJ22}, who considered the special case of a single…

One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Combinatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We…

As cellular operators are suffering from a data explosion problem, and users are consequently experiencing poor data services, the introduction of femtocells offers a cost-effective way to mitigate this problem. Femtocells enable larger…

Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings.…

We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, $K$ identical units of a good are sold to a group of buyers that have valuations…

The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…

Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…

This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…

Designing truthful, revenue maximizing auctions is a core problem of auction design. Multi-item settings have long been elusive. Recent work (arXiv:1706.03459) introduces effective deep learning techniques to find such auctions for the…

Auctions have been proposed as a way to provide economic incentives for primary users to dynamically allocate unused spectrum to other users in need of it. Previously proposed schemes do not take into account the fact that the power…