相关论文: A note on Cournot-Nash equilibria and Optimal Tran…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain $2$-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is…

Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…

This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textbook. Using labeled "best-response polytopes", we present the…

A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…

In this manuscript we derive a new nonlinear transport equation written on the space of probability measures that allows to study a class of deterministic mean field games and master equations, where the interaction of the agents happens…

It is known that the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality. Our aim in this work is to introduce a variational approach to study the existence of solutions for generalized ordinal Nash…

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…

Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained…

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…

In the paper we show that an important class of multistage traffic equillibrium models (including correspondence matrix calculation, traffic assignment problem etc) and their economic generalizations can be considered as proper population…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure…

We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the payoffs of the other player. In order for a solution of reasonable quality to be found,…