A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity
Theoretical Economics
2022-11-24 v1 Optimization and Control
Abstract
Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.
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Cite
@article{arxiv.2003.01536,
title = {A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity},
author = {Dimitri J. Papageorgiou and Francisco Trespalacios and Stuart Harwood},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.01536},
year = {2022}
}
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4 pages