相关论文: Noise Stability of Ranked Choice Voting
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…
We consider an odd-sized "jury", which votes sequentially between two states of Nature (say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty) with the majority opinion determining the verdict. Jurors have private information in the form of a signal in…
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among…
Consider a set $V$ of voters, represented by a multiset in a metric space $(X,d)$. The voters have to reach a decision -- a point in $X$. A choice $p\in X$ is called a $\beta$-plurality point for $V$, if for any other choice $q\in X$ it…
We analyze the performance of the Borda counting algorithm in a non-parametric model. The algorithm needs to utilize probabilistic rankings of the items within $m$-sized subsets to accurately determine which items are the overall top-$k$…
This paper studies how insurers can chose which claims to investigate for fraud. Given a prediction model, typically only claims with the highest predicted propability of being fraudulent are investigated. We argue that this can lead to…
The social ranking is a recently proposed framework for evaluating the power of individuals according to the performance ranking of their coalitions. Although its origin can be traced to the classical power indices in simple games, social…
The dueling bandit problem is a variation of the classical multi-armed bandit in which the allowable actions are noisy comparisons between pairs of arms. This paper focuses on a new approach for finding the "best" arm according to the Borda…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
In this paper we introduce an iterative voting algorithm and then use it to obtain a rating method which is very robust against collusion attacks as well as random and biased raters. Unlike the previous iterative methods, our method is not…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
In this paper we present a novel randomized block coordinate descent method for the minimization of a convex composite objective function. The method uses (approximate) partial second-order (curvature) information, so that the algorithm…
We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the closest proxy. The goal is to find a set of proxies that is…
We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In other words, if we assume that nodes vote on a…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, and Borda. We distinguish three types of methods: ranking by score, ranking by repeatedly choosing a winner that we delete and rank at the…