相关论文: Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in Zero-Sum and…

This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…

We study min-max algorithms to solve zero-sum differential games on Riemannian manifold. Based on the notions of differential Stackelberg equilibrium and differential Nash equilibrium on Riemannian manifold, we analyze the local convergence…

The extragradient method has gained popularity due to its robust convergence properties for differentiable games. Unlike single-objective optimization, game dynamics involve complex interactions reflected by the eigenvalues of the game…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…

This work studies Nash equilibrium seeking for a class of stochastic aggregative games, where each player has an expectation-valued objective function depending on its local strategy and the aggregate of all players' strategies. We propose…

We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a…

In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove…

We provide a unified analysis of two-timescale gradient descent ascent (TTGDA) for solving structured nonconvex minimax optimization problems in the form of $\min_\textbf{x} \max_{\textbf{y} \in Y} f(\textbf{x}, \textbf{y})$, where the…

We derive the rate of convergence to Nash equilibria for the payoff-based algorithm proposed in \cite{tat_kam_TAC}. These rates are achieved under the standard assumption of convexity of the game, strong monotonicity and differentiability…

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…

We analyze Nesterov's accelerated gradient descent (NAGD) for Nash equilibrium seeking in $N$-player quadratic games. While the continuous-time NAGD dynamics -- the Su--Boyd--Cand\`{e}s ODE -- are well understood for convex optimization,…

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for…

We study distributed algorithms for seeking a Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative convex games with strongly monotone mappings. Each player has access to her own smooth local cost function and can communicate to her neighbors in…

Memory-efficient optimization methods have recently gained increasing attention for scaling full-parameter training of large language models under the GPU-memory bottleneck. Existing approaches either lack clear convergence guarantees, or…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

In this paper, we introduce a bilevel optimization framework for addressing inverse mean-field games, alongside an exploration of numerical methods tailored for this bilevel problem. The primary benefit of our bilevel formulation lies in…

Last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics in games has attracted significant recent attention. In two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback, where only the loss of the selected action pair is observed, Fiegel et al. (2025) show a…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

We derive sublinear-time quantum algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of two-player zero-sum games, based on efficient Gibbs sampling methods. We are able to achieve speed-ups for both dense and sparse payoff matrices at the cost…