Approximating Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games via Stochastic Optimization
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-04-16 v3 Multiagent Systems
Abstract
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.06689,
title = {Approximating Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games via Stochastic Optimization},
author = {Ian Gemp and Luke Marris and Georgios Piliouras},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06689},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
Published at ICLR 2024