相关论文: Non(c)esuch Ballot-Level Risk-Limiting Audits for …
The City and County of San Francisco, CA, has used Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) for some elections since 2004. This report describes the first ever process pilot of Risk Limiting Audits for IRV, for the San Francisco District Attorney's race…
We introduce the notion of a risk-limiting financial auditing (RLFA): given $N$ transactions, the goal is to estimate the total misstated monetary fraction~($m^*$) to a given accuracy $\epsilon$, with confidence $1-\delta$. We do this by…
In the criminal legal context, risk assessment algorithms are touted as data-driven, well-tested tools. Studies known as validation tests are typically cited by practitioners to show that a particular risk assessment algorithm has…
In traditional access control policies, every access granted and administrative account introduces an additional vulnerability, as a corruption of a high-privilege user can compromise several sensitive files. Privocracy is an access control…
BRAVO, the most widely tried method for risk-limiting election audits, cannot accommodate sampling without replacement or stratified sampling, which can improve efficiency and may be required by law. It applies only to ballot-polling…
Large language model (LLM) summarization systems may pass compact vector representations of private inputs to downstream retrieval, monitoring, audit, or analytic workflows. Even when source documents remain access-restricted, derived…
Limited Voting (LV) is an approval-based method for multi-winner elections where all ballots are required to have a same fixed size. While it appears to be used as voting method in corporate governance and has some political applications,…
In this paper, we outline a way to deploy a privacy-preserving protocol for multiparty Randomized Controlled Trials on the scale of 500 million rows of data and more than a billion gates. Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are widely used…
The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and…
Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate multiple candidate responses for a given prompt, yet selecting the most reliable one remains challenging, especially when correctness diverges from surface-level majority agreement. Existing…
Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work, we report on pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008…
We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and correctness, without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt participants. All protocols have polynomial complexity and require private channels and a simultaneous…
A standard technique for scaling inference-time reasoning is Self-Consistency, whereby multiple candidate answers are sampled from an LLM and the most common answer is selected. More recently, it has been shown that weighted majority voting…
In many machine learning scenarios, looking for the best classifier that fits a particular dataset can be very costly in terms of time and resources. Moreover, it can require deep knowledge of the specific domain. We propose a new technique…
There are many sources of error in counting votes: the apparent winner might not be the rightful winner. Hand tallies of the votes in a random sample of precincts can be used to test the hypothesis that a full manual recount would find a…
This article * provides an overview of post-election audit sampling research and compares various approaches to calculating post-election audit sample sizes, focusing on risklimiting audits, * discusses fundamental concepts common to all…
Drawing a random sample of ballots to conduct a risk-limiting audit generally requires knowing how the ballots cast in an election are organized into groups, for instance, how many containers of ballots there are in all and how many ballots…
Overseas military personnel often face significant challenges in participating in elections due to the slow pace of traditional mail systems, which can result in ballots missing crucial deadlines. While internet-based voting offers a faster…
Current electronic voting systems require an anonymous channel during the voting phase to prevent coercion. Typically, low-latency anonymization-networks like Tor are used for this purpose. In this paper we devise a monitoring attack that…
We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and information-theoretic correctness, without assuming any bound on the number of corrupt voters or voting authorities. All protocols have polynomial complexity and require…