相关论文: Learning Security Strategies through Game Play and…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

In this paper, we explore the susceptibility of the independent Q-learning algorithms (a classical and widely used multi-agent reinforcement learning method) to strategic manipulation of sophisticated opponents in normal-form games played…

Linear dynamical systems that obey stochastic differential equations are canonical models. While optimal control of known systems has a rich literature, the problem is technically hard under model uncertainty and there are hardly any…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a…

In typical reinforcement learning (RL), the environment is assumed given and the goal of the learning is to identify an optimal policy for the agent taking actions through its interactions with the environment. In this paper, we extend this…

Security attacks present unique challenges to self-adaptive system design due to the adversarial nature of the environment. However, modeling the system as a single player, as done in prior works in security domain, is insufficient for the…

We consider a class of reinforcement-learning systems in which the agent follows a behavior policy to explore a discrete state-action space to find an optimal policy while adhering to some restriction on its behavior. Such restriction may…

A default assumption in the design of reinforcement-learning algorithms is that a decision-making agent always explores to learn optimal behavior. In sufficiently complex environments that approach the vastness and scale of the real world,…

We study how to synthesize a robust and safe policy for autonomous systems under signal temporal logic (STL) tasks in adversarial settings against unknown dynamic agents. To ensure the worst-case STL satisfaction, we propose STLGame, a…

Decision-making for autonomous driving is challenging, considering the complex interactions among multiple traffic agents (e.g., autonomous vehicles (AVs), human drivers, and pedestrians) and the computational load needed to evaluate these…

This study investigates the development of an optimal execution strategy through reinforcement learning, aiming to determine the most effective approach for traders to buy and sell inventory within a finite time horizon. Our proposed model…

The empirical success of Multi-agent reinforcement learning is encouraging, while few theoretical guarantees have been revealed. In this work, we prove that the plug-in solver approach, probably the most natural reinforcement learning…

Recently, safe reinforcement learning (RL) with the actor-critic structure for continuous control tasks has received increasing attention. It is still challenging to learn a near-optimal control policy with safety and convergence…

We consider the classic motion planning problem defined over a roadmap in which a vehicle seeks to find an optimal path from a source to a destination in presence of an attacker who can launch attacks on the vehicle over any edge of the…

We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics where players adjust their strategies based on their actions' cumulative payoffs over time - specifically, by playing mixed strategies that maximize their expected cumulative payoff…

We study automated security response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed, non-stationary game. We relax the standard assumption that the game model is correctly…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

In the network security arms race, the defender is significantly disadvantaged as they need to successfully detect and counter every malicious attack. In contrast, the attacker needs to succeed only once. To level the playing field, we…