相关论文: Sample-Efficient Learning of Correlated Equilibria…

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…

The paper is concerned with distributed learning and optimization in large-scale settings. The well-known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm has been shown to achieve Nash equilibrium learning in certain classes of multi-agent games. However,…

This work investigates the ambient potential identification problem in inverse Mean-Field Games (MFGs), where the goal is to recover the unknown potential from the value function at equilibrium. We propose a simple yet effective iterative…

We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her policy to the follower…

Non-cooperative games serve as a powerful framework for capturing the interactions among self-interested players and have broad applicability in modeling a wide range of practical scenarios, ranging from power management to drug delivery.…

Large-scale multi-agent systems are often deployed across wide geographic areas, where agents interact with heterogeneous environments. There is an emerging interest in understanding the role of heterogeneity in the performance of the…

We study the problem of stochastic combinatorial pure exploration (CPE), where an agent sequentially pulls a set of single arms (a.k.a. a super arm) and tries to find the best super arm. Among a variety of problem settings of the CPE, we…

Learning in games is a fundamental problem in machine learning and artificial intelligence, with numerous applications~\citep{silver2016mastering,schrittwieser2020mastering}. This work investigates two-player zero-sum matrix games with an…

A variety of practical problems can be modeled by the decision-making process in multi-player games where a group of self-interested players aim at optimizing their own local objectives, while the objectives depend on the actions taken by…

In this paper, we explore the benefit of cooperation in adversarial bandit settings. As a motivating example, we consider the problem of wireless network selection. Mobile devices are often required to choose the right network to associate…

In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…

We consider the problem of sequentially learning to estimate, in the mean squared error (MSE) sense, a Gaussian $K$-vector of unknown covariance by observing only $m < K$ of its entries in each round. We propose two MSE estimators, and…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

Tree-form sequential decision making (TFSDM) extends classical one-shot decision making by modeling tree-form interactions between an agent and a potentially adversarial environment. It captures the online decision-making problems that each…

We study a two-player zero-sum game in which the row player aims to maximize their payoff against a competing column player, under an unknown payoff matrix estimated through bandit feedback. We propose three algorithms based on the…

We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate…

We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…

Competitive games involving thousands or even millions of players are prevalent in real-world contexts, such as transportation, communications, and computer networks. However, learning in these large-scale multi-agent environments presents…

We study the Inverse Contextual Bandit (ICB) problem, in which a learner seeks to optimize a policy while an observer, who cannot access the learner's rewards and only observes actions, aims to recover the underlying problem parameters.…

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…