相关论文: Distort to Detect, not Affect: Detecting Stealthy …

For industrial control systems (ICS), many existing defense solutions focus on detecting attacks only when they make the system behave anomalously. Instead, in this work, we study how to detect attackers who are still in their hiding phase.…

Industrial control systems (ICS), which in many cases are components of critical national infrastructure, are increasingly being connected to other networks and the wider internet motivated by factors such as enhanced operational…

We address the problem of attack detection and isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

This paper investigates the vulnerability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems to stealthy sensor attacks during the learning phase. In particular, we demonstrate that a {data-driven} adversary, without access to the system model,…

Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of…

Neural networks are increasingly used for intrusion detection on industrial control systems (ICS). With neural networks being vulnerable to adversarial examples, attackers who wish to cause damage to an ICS can attempt to hide their attacks…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…

Eavesdropping attacks in inference systems aim to learn not the raw data, but the system inferences to predict and manipulate system actions. We argue that conventional information security measures can be ambiguous on the adversary's…

This paper considers a sensor attack and fault detection problem for linear cyber-physical systems, which are subject to system noise that can obey an unknown light-tailed distribution. We propose a new threshold-based detection mechanism…

We study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown…

This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…

Deep learning-based object detection has become ubiquitous in the last decade due to its high accuracy in many real-world applications. With this growing trend, these models are interested in being attacked by adversaries, with most of the…

Safety filters ensure that only safe control actions are executed. We propose a simple and stealthy false-data injection attack for deactivating such safety filters; in particular, we focus on deactivating safety filters that are based on…

Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…

The problem of mitigating maliciously injected signals in interconnected systems is dealt with in this paper. We consider the class of covert attacks, as they are stealthy and cannot be detected by conventional means in centralized…

In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…