相关论文: Silently Disabling ECUs and Enabling Blind Attacks…

Nowadays, vehicles have complex in-vehicle networks (IVNs) with millions of lines of code controlling almost every function in the vehicle including safety-critical functions. It has recently been shown that IVNs are becoming increasingly…

The vehicular connectivity revolution is fueling the automotive industry's most significant transformation seen in decades. However, as modern vehicles become more connected, they also become much more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In this…

ARINC 429 is the most common data bus in use today in civil avionics. However, the protocol lacks any form of source authentication. A technician with physical access to the bus is able to replace a transmitter by a rogue device, and the…

Increasing automation in vehicles enabled by increased connectivity to the outside world has exposed vulnerabilities in previously siloed automotive networks like controller area networks (CAN). Attributes of CAN such as broadcast-based…

As connectivity between and within vehicles increases, so does concern about safety and security. Various automotive serial protocols are used inside vehicles such as Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN) and…

Modern vehicles communicate data to and from sensors, actuators, and electronic control units (ECUs) using Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, which operates on differential signaling. An autonomous ECU responsible for the execution of…

In-vehicle communications are not designed for message exchange between the vehicles and outside systems originally. Thus, the security design of message protection is insufficient. Moreover, the internal devices do not have enough…

The widening spectrum of applications and services provided by portable and embedded devices bring a new dimension of concerns in security. Most of those embedded systems (pay-TV, PDAs, mobile phones, etc...) make use of external memory. As…

Recent years have seen an exponential rise in complex software-driven functionality in vehicles, leading to a rising number of electronic control units (ECUs), network capabilities, and interfaces. These expanded capabilities also bring-in…

Intelligent attackers can suitably tamper sensor/actuator data at various Smart grid surfaces causing intentional power oscillations, which if left undetected, can lead to voltage disruptions. We develop a novel combination of formal…

The network of services, including delivery, farming, and environmental monitoring, has experienced exponential expansion in the past decade with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Yet, UAVs are not robust enough against cyberattacks,…

Differential signaling is a method of data transmission that uses two complementary electrical signals to encode information. This allows a receiver to reject any noise by looking at the difference between the two signals, assuming the…

As the development of autonomous and connected vehicles advances, the complexity of modern vehicles increases, with numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs) integrated into the system. In an in-vehicle network, these ECUs communicate with…

Autonomous driving and advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) rely on cameras to control the driving. In many prior approaches an attacker aiming to stop the vehicle had to send messages on the specialized and better-defended CAN bus. We…

Attackers demonstrated the use of remote access to the in-vehicle network of connected vehicles to launch cyber-attacks and remotely take control of these vehicles. Machine-learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) techniques have…

Vehicular Controller Area Networks (CANs) are susceptible to cyber attacks of different levels of sophistication. Fabrication attacks are the easiest to administer -- an adversary simply sends (extra) frames on a CAN -- but also the easiest…

Event-triggered control (ETC) holds the potential to significantly improve the efficiency of wireless networked control systems. Unfortunately, its real-world impact has hitherto been hampered by the lack of a network stack able to transfer…

For decades, the Controller Area Network (CAN) has served as the primary in-vehicle bus (IVB) and extended its use to many non-vehicular systems. Over the past years, CAN security has been intensively scrutinized, yielding extensive…

This work presents an experimental evaluation of the detection performance of eight different algorithms for anomaly detection on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus of modern vehicles based on the analysis of the timing or frequency of…

Cars can nowadays record several thousands of signals through the CAN bus technology and potentially provide real-time information on the car, the driver and the surrounding environment. This paper proposes a new method for the analysis and…