相关论文: A note on coupled constraint Nash games

In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium. It actually yields Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…

Inspired by a paper of R. W. Rosenthal, we investigate generalized Nash-equilibria of integer programming games. We show that generalized Nash-equilibria always exist and are related to an optimal solution of a so-called N-fold integer…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…

Any individual's preference represents his choice in the set of available options. It is said to be complete if the person can compare any pair of available options. We aim to initiate the notion of projected solutions for the generalized…

We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

A new combinatorial game is given. It generalizes both Substraction and Nim. It is proved the computation of Nash equilibrium points in this new game is NP-hard.

Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…

To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…

An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

We prove an existence result for the time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium problem under generalized convexity using a fixed point theorem. Furthermore, an application to the dynamic abstract economy is considered.

We prove three results on the existence and structure of Nash equilibria for quasisupermodular games. A theorem is purely order-theoretic, and the other two involve topological hypotheses. Our topological results genralize Zhou's theorem…

A quasi-equilibrium problem is an equilibrium problem where the constraint set does depend on the reference point. It generalizes important problems such as quasi-variational inequalities and generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We study…

This paper investigates closed-loop Nash equilibria for discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic nonzero-sum difference games with random coefficients. Unlike existing works, we consider randomness in both state dynamics and cost…

We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it. The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and two entangled qubit system. The Nash Equilibrium…