相关论文: Experimental evaluation of sensor attacks and defe…

We consider the problem of estimating the state of a noisy linear dynamical system when an unknown subset of sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a secure state estimation algorithm, and derive (optimal) bounds on…

Sensor systems are extremely popular today and vulnerable to sensor data attacks. Due to possible devastating consequences, counteracting sensor data attacks is an extremely important topic, which has not seen sufficient study. This paper…

Learning-enabled controllers used in cyber-physical systems (CPS) are known to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Such attacks manifest as perturbations to the states generated by the controller's environment in response to its actions.…

In a backdoor attack, an adversary inserts maliciously constructed backdoor examples into a training set to make the resulting model vulnerable to manipulation. Defending against such attacks typically involves viewing these inserted…

As cyber-physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade…

In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data…

We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the…

We consider feedback control systems where sensor readings may be compromised by a malicious attacker intending on causing damage to the system. We study this problem at the supervisory layer of the control system, using discrete event…

In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…

This paper is concerned with the detection, resilient and fault-tolerant control issues for cyber-physical systems. To this end, the impairment of system dynamics caused by the defined types of cyber-attacks and process faults is analyzed.…

In this article, we address the problem of risk assessment of stealthy attacks on uncertain control systems. Considering data injection attacks that aim at maximizing impact while remaining undetected, we use the recently proposed…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

The advantages of using communication networks to interconnect controllers and physical plants motivate the increasing number of Networked Control Systems, in industrial and critical infrastructure facilities. However, this integration also…

We consider malicious attacks on actuators and sensors of a feedback system which can be modeled as additive, possibly unbounded, disturbances at the digital (cyber) part of the feedback loop. We precisely characterize the role of the…

Backdoor attacks aim to surreptitiously insert malicious triggers into DNN models, granting unauthorized control during testing scenarios. Existing methods lack robustness against defense strategies and predominantly focus on enhancing…

The stealth of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against feedback sensors in linear time-varying (LTV) control systems is investigated. In that regard, the following notions of stealth are pursued: For some finite $\epsilon > 0$, i) an…

Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…

We introduce the problem of learning-based attacks in a simple abstraction of cyber-physical systems---the case of a discrete-time, linear, time-invariant plant that may be subject to an attack that overrides the sensor readings and the…