相关论文: Efficient Episodic Learning of Nonstationary and U…

The Colonel Blotto game is a renowned resource allocation problem with a long-standing literature in game theory (almost 100 years). However, its scope of application is still restricted by the lack of studies on the incomplete-information…

We address the problem of learning to control an unknown nonlinear dynamical system through sequential interactions. Motivated by high-stakes applications in which mistakes can be catastrophic, such as robotics and healthcare, we study…

Non-cooperative games serve as a powerful framework for capturing the interactions among self-interested players and have broad applicability in modeling a wide range of practical scenarios, ranging from power management to drug delivery.…

This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

The framework of uncoupled online learning in multiplayer games has made significant progress in recent years. In particular, the development of time-varying games has considerably expanded its modeling capabilities. However, current regret…

Federated learning offers a decentralized approach to machine learning, where multiple agents collaboratively train a model while preserving data privacy. In this paper, we investigate the decision-making and equilibrium behavior in…

A \emph{saddlepoint} of an $n \times n$ matrix is an entry that is the maximum of its row and the minimum of its column. Saddlepoints give the \emph{value} of a two-player zero-sum game, corresponding to its pure-strategy Nash equilibria;…

This work studies the problem of learning episodic Markov Decision Processes with known transition and bandit feedback. We develop the first algorithm with a ``best-of-both-worlds'' guarantee: it achieves $\mathcal{O}(log T)$ regret when…

In this paper, online game is studied, where at each time, a group of players aim at selfishly minimizing their own time-varying cost function simultaneously subject to time-varying coupled constraints and local feasible set constraints.…

We introduce data-driven decision-making algorithms that achieve state-of-the-art \emph{dynamic regret} bounds for non-stationary bandit settings. These settings capture applications such as advertisement allocation, dynamic pricing, and…

Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution…

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…

We study preference learning through recommendations in multi-agent game settings, where a moderator repeatedly interacts with agents whose utility functions are unknown. In each round, the moderator issues action recommendations and…

Learning Nash equilibrium (NE) in complex zero-sum games with multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can be extremely computationally expensive. Curriculum learning is an effective way to accelerate learning, but an under-explored…

This paper proposes a new method for finding closed-loop saddle points in zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential games by decoupling their inherent structure. Specifically, we develop a nested iterative scheme that constructs a…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

Bandits with feedback graphs are powerful online learning models that interpolate between the full information and classic bandit problems, capturing many real-life applications. A recent work by Zhang et al. (2023) studies the contextual…

We propose efficient no-regret learning dynamics and ellipsoid-based methods for computing linear correlated equilibria$\unicode{x2014}$a relaxation of correlated equilibria and a strengthening of coarse correlated…

A long line of works characterizes the sample complexity of regret minimization in sequential decision-making by min-max programs. In the corresponding saddle-point game, the min-player optimizes the sampling distribution against an…