相关论文: Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules

The Winner Determination Problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, and no existing method reliably predicts which instances will defeat fast greedy heuristics. The ML-for-combinatorial-optimization community has focused on…

Product feature recommendations are critical for online customers to purchase the right products based on the right features. For a customer, selecting the product that has the best trade-off between price and functionality is a…

The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…

This research presents a predictive model to identify potential targets of activist investment funds--entities that acquire significant corporate stakes to influence strategic and operational decisions, ultimately enhancing shareholder…

In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…

This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's…

Auctions are a vital economic mechanism used to determine the market value of goods or services through competitive bidding within a specific framework. However, much of the current research primarily focuses on the bidding algorithms used…

We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…

The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…

With the adoption of machine learning-based solutions in routine clinical practice, the need for reliable interpretability tools has become pressing. Shapley values provide local explanations. The method gained popularity in recent years.…

We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and investigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after the classical knapsack problem. In these…

The coefficient of determination, the $R^2$, is often used to measure the variance explained by an affine combination of multiple explanatory covariates. An attribution of this explanatory contribution to each of the individual covariates…

Cohort Shapley value is a model-free method of variable importance grounded in game theory that does not use any unobserved and potentially impossible feature combinations. We use it to evaluate algorithmic fairness, using the well known…

We derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities lending perspective, under different assumptions, and show a weighting scheme that converges to the true valuation. We illustrate conditions under which our…

The dominating set problem has many practical applications but is well-known to be NP-hard. Therefore, there is a need for efficient approximation algorithms, especially in applications such as ad hoc wireless networks. Most distributed…

The study aimed at detecting cartel collusion involved analyzing decisions of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service and data on auctions. As a result, a machine learning model was developed that predicts with 91% accuracy the signs of…

While preference modelling is becoming one of the pillars of machine learning, the problem of preference explanation remains challenging and underexplored. In this paper, we propose \textsc{Pref-SHAP}, a Shapley value-based model…

A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants, however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain…

In this paper we investigate the problem of quantifying the contribution of each variable to the satisfying assignments of a Boolean function based on the Shapley value. Our main result is a polynomial-time equivalence between computing…