相关论文: Data-Driven Contract Design for Multi-Agent System…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

In the combinatorial-action contract model (D\"utting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the…

Collusion in market pricing is a concept associated with human actions to raise market prices through artificially limited supply. Recently, the idea of algorithmic collusion was put forward, where the human action in the pricing process is…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

We present an effective technique for training deep learning agents capable of negotiating on a set of clauses in a contract agreement using a simple communication protocol. We use Multi Agent Reinforcement Learning to train both agents…

A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We…

We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a costly and unobservable action. When all of the model…

Deep reinforcement learning algorithms have recently been used to train multiple interacting agents in a centralised manner whilst keeping their execution decentralised. When the agents can only acquire partial observations and are faced…

In this paper, we present a solution to a design problem of control strategies for multi-agent cooperative transport. Although existing learning-based methods assume that the number of agents is the same as that in the training environment,…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…

We study linear contracts for combinatorial problems in multi-agent settings. In this problem, a principal designs a linear contract with several agents, each of whom can decide to take a costly action or not. The principal observes only…

A central question in multi-agent strategic games deals with learning the underlying utilities driving the agents' behaviour. Motivated by the increasing availability of large data-sets, we develop an unifying data-driven technique to…

Multi-agent systems driven by large language models (LLMs) have shown promising abilities for solving complex tasks in a collaborative manner. This work considers a fundamental problem in multi-agent collaboration: consensus seeking. When…

Joint attention - the ability to purposefully coordinate attention with another agent, and mutually attend to the same thing -- is a critical component of human social cognition. In this paper, we ask whether joint attention can be useful…

This paper addresses the task of joint multi-agent perception and planning, especially as it relates to the real-world challenge of collision-free navigation for connected self-driving vehicles. For this task, several communication-enabled…

Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring…

We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…

We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in general be complicated), we characterize the optimal rate at…

In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…