相关论文: Detecting bid-rigging coalitions in different coun…

In railway infrastructure, construction and maintenance is typically procured using competitive procedures such as auctions. However, these procedures only fulfill their purpose - using (taxpayers') money efficiently - if bidders do not…

We propose a new method for flagging bid rigging, which is particularly useful for detecting incomplete bid-rigging cartels. Our approach combines screens, i.e. statistics derived from the distribution of bids in a tender, with machine…

Adding to the literature on the data-driven detection of bid-rigging cartels, we propose a novel approach based on deep learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) that flags cartel participants based on their pairwise bidding…

The study aimed at detecting cartel collusion involved analyzing decisions of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service and data on auctions. As a result, a machine learning model was developed that predicts with 91% accuracy the signs of…

Collusion and capacity withholding in electricity wholesale markets are important mechanisms of market manipulation. This study applies a refined machine learning-based cartel detection algorithm to two cartel cases in the Italian…

Competing firms can increase profits by setting prices collectively, imposing significant costs on consumers. Such groups of firms are known as cartels and because this behavior is illegal, their operations are secretive and difficult to…

We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, $K$ identical units of a good are sold to a group of buyers that have valuations…

A major threat to the peer-review systems of computer science conferences is the existence of "collusion rings" between reviewers. In such collusion rings, reviewers who have also submitted their own papers to the conference work together…

We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…

In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily…

Shill bidding occurs when fake bids are introduced into an auction on the seller's behalf in order to artificially inflate the final price. This is typically achieved by the seller having friends bid in her auctions, or the seller controls…

Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…

We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class,…

Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important…

In financial markets, abnormal trading behaviors pose a serious challenge to market surveillance and risk management. What is worse, there is an increasing emergence of abnormal trading events that some experienced traders constitute a…

Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…

Collaborative filtering or recommender systems use a database about user preferences to predict additional topics or products a new user might like. In this paper we describe several algorithms designed for this task, including techniques…

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…

We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…

Collusion among bidders adversely affects procurement cost and in some cases efficiency, and it seems collusion is more prevalent that we would like. Statistical methods of detecting collusion just using bid data, in a hope to deter future…