相关论文: Cursed yet Satisfied Agents

Sponsored search in E-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Taobao and Tmall provides sellers an effective way to reach potential buyers with most relevant purpose. In this paper, we study the auction mechanism optimization problem in…

We study the effect of providing information to agents who queue before a scarce good is distributed at a fixed time. Many information policies reveal "sudden bad news," when agents learn the queue is longer than previously believed. Sudden…

We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the…

When society maintains a competitive system to promote an abstract goal, competition by necessity relies on imperfect proxy measures. For instance profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital…

We propose a model-agnostic approach for mitigating the prediction bias of a black-box decision-maker, and in particular, a human decision-maker. Our method detects in the feature space where the black-box decision-maker is biased and…

We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…

This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for…

In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…

New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or…

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…

In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility they obtain from any subset of the items. Our focus is…

We explore the effects of social influence in a simple market model in which a large number of agents face a binary choice: 'to buy/not to buy' a single unit of a product at a price posted by a single seller (the monopoly case). We consider…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…

Pertaining to Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), this work presents two models for the rise and downfall of speculative bubbles through an exchange price fixing based on double auction mechanisms. The first model is based on a…

We consider the impact of fairness requirements on the social efficiency of truthful mechanisms for trade, focusing on Bayesian bilateral-trade settings. Unlike the full information case in which all gains-from-trade can be realized and…

When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give…

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…

We present a model elucidating wishful thinking, which comprehensively incorporates both the costs and benefits associated with biased beliefs. Our findings reveal that wishful thinking behavior can be characterized as equivalent to…