相关论文: A Robust Stackelberg Game for Cyber-Security Inves…

We study data corruption robustness in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. Given a dataset of realized trajectories of two players, an adversary is allowed to modify an $\epsilon$-fraction of it. The learner's goal is to identify an…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

Aggregators of distributed energy resources are increasingly encouraged to participate in wholesale market bidding. However, the delivery of the power they are awarded can result in over-voltage or congestion issues within the distribution…

Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly…

Ensuring public safety in a Smart City (SC) environment is a critical and increasingly complicated task due to the involvement of multiple agencies and the city's expansion across cyber and social layers. In this paper, we propose an…

A two-player finite horizon linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game is considered. The feature of this game is that the control cost of a follower in the cost functionals of both players is small, which means that the game under…

Green Security Games have become a popular way to model scenarios involving the protection of natural resources, such as wildlife. Sensors (e.g. drones equipped with cameras) have also begun to play a role in these scenarios by providing…

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity,…

Motivated by safety-critical classification problems, we investigate adversarial attacks against cost-sensitive classifiers. We use current state-of-the-art adversarially-resistant neural network classifiers [1] as the underlying models.…

This paper proposes a peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help the centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which…

We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…

We consider a Markovian stochastic control problem with model uncertainty. The controller (intelligent player) observes only the state, and, therefore, uses feed-back (closed-loop) strategies. The adverse player (nature) who does not have a…

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the…

This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…

Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increasing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilibrium computation is an important research problem. While prior…

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…

An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…