相关论文: A Robust Stackelberg Game for Cyber-Security Inves…

In many consumer electronics and appliance markets, manufacturers sell products through competing retailers while simultaneously relying on take-back programs to recover used items for remanufacturing. Designing such programs is challenging…

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and…

A fortification game (FG) is a three-level, two-player Stackelberg game, also known as defender-attacker-defender game, in which at the uppermost level, the defender selects some assets to be protected from potential malicious attacks. At…

In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework: Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs). In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct…

In this paper, we consider a class of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which aims at overloading the communication channel. On top of the security issue, continuous or periodic transmission of information within feedback loop is necessary…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

A decentralized network of cognitive and non-cognitive transmitters where each transmitter aims at maximizing his energy-efficiency is considered. The cognitive transmitters are assumed to be able to sense the transmit power of their…

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous state is…

The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…

Defending against sophisticated cyber threats demands strategic allocation of limited security resources across complex network infrastructures. When the defender has limited defensive resources, the complexity of coordinating honeypot…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

The paper proposes a novel neuroevolutionary method (NESG) for calculating leader's payoff in Stackelberg Security Games. The heart of NESG is strategy evaluation neural network (SENN). SENN is able to effectively evaluate leader's…