相关论文: Side-Channel Trojan Insertion -- a Practical Found…

The resource-constrained nature of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices, poses a challenge in designing a secure, reliable, and particularly high-performance communication for this family of devices. Although side-channel resistant ciphers…

Circuit obfuscation is a frequently used approach to conceal logic functionalities in order to prevent reverse engineering attacks on fabricated chips. Efficient obfuscation implementations are expected with lower design complexity and…

Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire…

Neural network controllers are increasingly deployed in robotic systems for tasks such as trajectory tracking and pose stabilization. However, their reliance on potentially untrusted training pipelines or supply chains introduces…

Various side-channel attacks (SCAs) on ICs have been successfully demonstrated and also mitigated to some degree. In the context of 3D ICs, however, prior art has mainly focused on efficient implementations of classical SCA countermeasures.…

Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot easily be updated…

Due to the constant increase and versatility of IoT devices that should keep sensitive information private, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks on embedded devices are gaining visibility in the industrial field. The integration and…

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are well-known threats to sensitive hardware like advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto cores. Given the significant impact of supply voltages (VCCs) on power profiles, various countermeasures based on…

To be secure, cryptographic algorithms crucially rely on the underlying hardware to avoid inadvertent leakage of secrets through timing side channels. Unfortunately, such timing channels are ubiquitous in modern hardware, due to its…

In this paper, we investigate the advanced circuit features such as wordline- (WL) underdrive (prevents retention failure) and overdrive (assists write) employed in the peripherals of Dynamic RAM (DRAM) memories from a security perspective.…

Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation.…

We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and…

Analog and mixed-signal (A/MS) integrated circuits (ICs) are crucial in modern electronics, playing key roles in signal processing, amplification, sensing, and power management. Many IC companies outsource manufacturing to third-party…

Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…

The increasing cost of integrated circuit (IC) fabrication has driven most companies to "go fabless" over time. The corresponding outsourcing trend gave rise to various attack vectors, e.g., illegal overproduction of ICs, piracy of the…

Trojan attacks on deep neural networks are both dangerous and surreptitious. Over the past few years, Trojan attacks have advanced from using only a single input-agnostic trigger and targeting only one class to using multiple,…

Sequential logic locking has been studied over the last decade as a method to protect sequential circuits from reverse engineering. However, most of the existing sequential logic locking techniques are threatened by increasingly more…

At S&P 2023, Puschner et al. made a valuable dataset for hardware Trojan detection research publicly available. It contains a complete set of Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) images of four different digital Integrated Circuits (ICs)…

Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for…