相关论文: A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk…
We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the…
Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…
We propose a model of whataboutism -- a rhetorical strategy that deflects criticism by citing similar misconduct that goes uncriticized on the critic's side -- and study its implications for social norms governing offensive speech. In an…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
The recently proposed {\em cybersecurity dynamics} approach aims to understand cybersecurity from a holistic perspective by modeling the evolution of the global cybersecurity state. These models describe the interactions between the various…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…
Markov games provide a powerful framework for modeling strategic multi-agent interactions in dynamic environments. Traditionally, convergence properties of decentralized learning algorithms in these settings have been established only for…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
Parallel server systems in transportation, manufacturing, and computing heavily rely on dynamic routing using connected cyber components for computation and communication. Yet, these components remain vulnerable to random malfunctions and…
This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's…
Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing…
Given the scale of consequences attributable to cyber attacks, the field of cybersecurity has long outgrown ad-hoc decision-making. A popular choice to provide disciplined decision-making in cybersecurity is Game Theory, which seeks to…
How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how…
Classification problems in security settings are usually contemplated as confrontations in which one or more adversaries try to fool a classifier to obtain a benefit. Most approaches to such adversarial classification problems have focused…
Epidemiological models increasingly rely on self-reported behavioral data such as vaccination status, mask usage, and social distancing adherence to forecast disease transmission and assess the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are useful for simulating social behavior in settings that are too complex for other theoretical approaches like game theory. However, they have not yet been empirically supported by laboratory…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound…