Blameworthiness in Security Games
Artificial Intelligence
2019-11-13 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory
Logic in Computer Science
Logic
Abstract
Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1910.08647,
title = {Blameworthiness in Security Games},
author = {Pavel Naumov and Jia Tao},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.08647},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20), February 7-12, 2020, New York, New York, USA