The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games
Artificial Intelligence
2019-01-25 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Logic in Computer Science
Logic
Abstract
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts this approach and proposes a modal logical system for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness. The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1901.08467,
title = {The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games},
author = {Rui Cao and Pavel Naumov},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08467},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1809.05485