相关论文: Barter Exchange via Friends' Friends

ChatGPT disrupted the application of machine-learning methods and drastically reduced the usage barrier. Chatbots are now widely used in a lot of different situations. They provide advice, assist in writing source code, or assess and…

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…

This article identifies how scarcity, abundance, and sufficiency influence exchange behavior. Analyzing the mechanisms governing exchange of resources constitutes the foundation of several social-science perspectives. Neoclassical economics…

Ethereum has emerged as a dynamic platform for exchanging cryptocurrency tokens. While token crowdsales cannot simultaneously guarantee buyers both certainty of valuation and certainty of participation, we show that if each token buyer…

This paper presents karma mechanisms, a novel approach to the repeated allocation of a scarce resource among competing agents over an infinite time. Examples include deciding which ride hailing trip requests to serve during peak demand,…

We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…

We define and analyze a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in which decision-making agents can observe the choices and rewards of their neighbors. Neighbors are defined by a network graph with heterogeneous and stochastic…

In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…

New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…

Many real matching markets encounter distributional and fairness constraints. Motivated by the Chinese Major Transition Program (CMT), this paper studies the design of exchange mechanisms within a fresh framework of both distributional and…

We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…

We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…

We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…

In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in…

We use a principal-agent model to analyze the structure of a book-driven dealer market when the dealer faces competition from a crossing network or dark pool. The agents are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios),…

In financial applications, latency advantages -- the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done -- can provide individual participants with an edge by allowing them to gather…

A novel algorithm for actively trading stocks is presented. While traditional expert advice and "universal" algorithms (as well as standard technical trading heuristics) attempt to predict winners or trends, our approach relies on…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract transactions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic…

We study the role of contextual information in the online learning problem of brokerage between traders. In this sequential problem, at each time step, two traders arrive with secret valuations about an asset they wish to trade. The learner…