相关论文: Inducing Equilibria in Networked Public Goods Game…

In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…

The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such applications, this paper is dedicated to fundamental modeling…

Formal analyses of incentives for compliance with network protocols often appeal to game-theoretic models and concepts. Applications of game-theoretic analysis to network security have generally been limited to highly stylized models, where…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…

In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…

While game-theoretic planning frameworks are effective at modeling multi-agent interactions, they require solving large optimization problems where the number of variables increases with the number of agents, resulting in long computation…

In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…

We consider a multi-user network where a network manager and selfish users interact. The network manager monitors the behavior of users and intervenes in the interaction among users if necessary, while users make decisions independently to…

Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system.…

We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…

Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…

In this paper, we study decentralized decision-making where agents optimize private objectives under incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring, in a non-cooperative setting. By shaping utilities-embedding shadow prices or…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

It is a challenging task to reach global cooperation among self-interested agents, which often requires sophisticated design or usage of incentives. For example, we may apply supervisors or referees who are able to detect and punish…