相关论文: Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms with Ri…
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
In this paper the capacitated hub location problem is formulated by a minimax regret model, which takes into account uncertain setup cost and demand. We focus on hub location with multiple allocations as a strategic problem requiring one…
In this paper we are interested in the task of searching and tracking multiple moving targets in a bounded surveillance area with a group of autonomous mobile agents. More specifically, we assume that targets can appear and disappear at…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. In the classical pure location Hotelling game businesses compete for maximizing…
Visual event perception tasks such as action localization have primarily focused on supervised learning settings under a static observer, i.e., the camera is static and cannot be controlled by an algorithm. They are often restricted by the…
We consider a team of autonomous agents that navigate in an adversarial environment and aim to achieve a task by allocating their resources over a set of target locations. An adversary in the environment observes the autonomous team's…
Designing mechanisms that leverage cooperation between agents has been a long-lasting goal in Multiagent Systems. The task is especially challenging when agents are selfish, lack common goals and face social dilemmas, i.e., situations in…
This paper examines a novel type of multi-agent problem, in which an agent makes multiple identical copies of itself in order to achieve a single agent task better or more efficiently. This strategy improves performance if the environment…
Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously and collision-free through a shared area toward given goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such applications, this paper is dedicated to fundamental modeling…
Planning is one of the main approaches used to improve agents' working efficiency by making plans beforehand. However, during planning, agents face the risk of having their private information leaked. This paper proposes a novel strong…
Agents in dynamic multi-agent environments must monitor their peers to execute individual and group plans. A key open question is how much monitoring of other agents' states is required to be effective: The Monitoring Selectivity Problem.…
LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit…
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…
We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
It is always a challenging task for multi-agent systems to achieve efficient and robust coverage in uncertain environments. The absence of global positioning information on the uncertain environment introduces significant complexity to the…