相关论文: On the Price of Satisficing in Network User Equili…

Boundedly Rational User Equilibria (BRUE) capture situations where all agents on a transportation network are electing the fastest option up to some time indifference, and serve as a relaxation of User Equilibria (UE), where each agent…

We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…

Solving the road congestion problem is one of the most pressing issues in moderncities since it causes time wasting, pollution, higher industrial costs and huge roadmaintenance costs. Advances in ITS technologies and the advent of…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

Modelling passenger assignments in public transport networks is a fundamental task for city planners, especially when deliberating network infrastructure decisions. A key aspect of a realistic model is to integrate passengers' selfish…

Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

A key measure of performance and comfort in a road traffic network is the travel time that the users of the network experience to complete their journeys. Travel times on road traffic networks are stochastic, highly variable, and dependent…

We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…

Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) models depict the perception differences in traffic assignment problems. According to the assumption of an unbounded perceived travel time distribution, the conventional SUE problems result in a positive…

In the era of connected and automated mobility, commuters will possess strong computation power, enabling them to strategically make sequential travel choices over a planning horizon. This paper investigates the multiday traffic patterns…

Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…

We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…

Consider a distribution of citizens in an urban area in which some services (supermarkets, post offices...) are present. Each citizen, in order to use a service, spends an amount of time which is due both to the travel time to the service…

When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…

We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…

We have revealed general physical conditions for the {\it maximization} of the network throughput at which free flow conditions are ensured, i.e., traffic breakdown cannot occur in the whole traffic or transportation network. A physical…

We study routing behavior in transportation networks with mixed autonomy, that is, networks in which a fraction of the vehicles on each road are equipped with autonomous capabilities such as adaptive cruise control that enable reduced…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

Within mobility systems, the presence of self-interested users can lead to aggregate routing patterns that are far from the societal optimum which could be achieved by centrally controlling the users' choices. In this paper, we design a…