相关论文: Global Convergence of Policy Gradient for Sequenti…

We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPG). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space…

A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…

We explore reinforcement learning methods for finding the optimal policy in the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problem. In particular, we consider the convergence of policy gradient methods in the setting of known and unknown parameters.…

We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient…

There has been substantial recent progress on the theoretical understanding of model-free approaches to Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) problems. Much attention has been devoted to the special case when the goal is to drive the state close…

We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…

We consider the continuous-time Linear-Quadratic-Regulator (LQR) problem in terms of optimizing a real-valued matrix function over the set of feedback gains. The results developed are in parallel to those in Bu et al. [1] for discrete-time…

In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…

Policy gradient algorithms are widely used in reinforcement learning and belong to the class of approximate dynamic programming methods. This paper studies two key policy gradient algorithms, the Natural Policy Gradient and the Gauss-Newton…

We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…

We derive sublinear-time quantum algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of two-player zero-sum games, based on efficient Gibbs sampling methods. We are able to achieve speed-ups for both dense and sparse payoff matrices at the cost…

Multi-agent games in dynamic nonlinear settings are challenging due to the time-varying interactions among the agents and the non-stationarity of the (potential) Nash equilibria. In this paper we consider model-free games, where agent…

We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…

We study the convergence to local Nash equilibria of gradient methods for two-player zero-sum differentiable games. It is well-known that such dynamics converge locally when $S \succ 0$ and may diverge when $S=0$, where $S\succeq 0$ is the…

We contribute the first provable guarantees of global convergence to Nash equilibria (NE) in two-player zero-sum convex Markov games (cMGs) by using independent policy gradient methods. Convex Markov games, recently defined by Gemp et al.…

This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg mean field games of backward-forward stochastic systems, involving a backward leader and a substantial number of forward followers. The leader initiates by providing its…

Direct policy gradient methods for reinforcement learning and continuous control problems are a popular approach for a variety of reasons: 1) they are easy to implement without explicit knowledge of the underlying model 2) they are an…

Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…