相关论文: Cooperator-driven and defector-driven punishments:…

Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…

Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

It has been an old unsolved puzzle to evolutionary theorists on which mechanisms would increase large-scale cooperation in human societies. Thus, how such mechanisms operate in a biological network is still not very understood. This study…

Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed…

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…

Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and indirect reciprocity, where individuals cooperate to build a positive reputation for future benefits, plays a key role in promoting it. Previous theoretical and experimental studies have…

Peer punishment of free-riders (defectors) is a key mechanism for promoting cooperation in society. However, it is highly unstable since some cooperators may contribute to a common project but refuse to punish defectors. Centralized…

Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the…

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy.…

Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…

The evolution and maintenance of cooperation fascinated researchers for several decades. Recently, theoretical models and experimental evidence show that costly punishment may facilitate cooperation in human societies, but may not be used…

Mixed-motive scenarios are ubiquitous in real-world multi-agent interactions, where self-interested agents often defect for immediate rewards, overlooking the potential of altruistic cooperation to improve long-term gains and collective…

Punishment is an effective way to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. In most of previous studies, objects of punishment are set to be defectors. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the…

This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary…

We construct a two species evolutionary game model of an online society consisting of ordinary users and behavior enforcers (moderators). Among themselves, moderators play a coordination game choosing between being "positive" or "negative"…

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,…