相关论文: Stackelberg Punishment and Bully-Proofing Autonomo…

We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and…

Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction…

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…

Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal…

This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…

This paper formulates a Stackelberg game between a coordination agent and participating homes to control the overall load consumption of a residential neighborhood. Each home optimizes a comfort-cost trade off to determine a load schedule…

When humans interact with robots influence is inevitable. Consider an autonomous car driving near a human: the speed and steering of the autonomous car will affect how the human drives. Prior works have developed frameworks that enable…

Increasing urbanization and exacerbation of sustainability goals threaten the operational efficiency of current transportation systems and confront cities with complex choices with huge impact on future generations. At the same time, the…

A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…

Punishment is probably the most frequently used mechanism to increase cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG); however, it is expensive. To address this problem, this paper introduces an optimal control problem that uses fractional…

Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…

In this paper, we address the much-anticipated deployment of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in society by modeling and analyzing the social-mobility dilemma in a game-theoretic approach. We formulate this dilemma as a normal-form…

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…

This paper studies game-theoretic decision-making for autonomous vehicles (AVs). A receding horizon multi-player game is formulated to model the AV decision-making problem. Two classes of games, including Nash game and Stackelber games, are…

In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize…

In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…