相关论文: Sometime a Paradox, Now Proof: Non-First-Order-iza…

To counter a general belief that all the paradoxes stem from a kind of circularity (or involve some self--reference, or use a diagonal argument) Stephen Yablo designed a paradox in 1993 that seemingly avoided self--reference. We turn…

In this short paper, I present a few theorems on sentences of arithmetic which are related to Yablo's Paradox as G\"odel's first undecidable sentence was related to the Liar paradox. In particular, I consider two different arithemetizations…

Using a graph representation of classical logic, the paper shows that the liar or Yablo pattern occurs in every semantic paradox. The core graph theoretic result generalizes theorem of Richardson, showing solvability of finite graphs…

This article discusses the logical errors in the liar paradox, G\"odel's incompleteness theorems, Russell's paradox, and the halting problem. In order to avoid these errors, a redefinition of logic has been presented, which is concluded as…

The investigations on higher-order type theories and on the related notion of parametric polymorphism constitute the technical counterpart of the old foundational problem of the circularity (or impredicativity) of second and higher order…

I'll discuss how Goedel's paradox "This statement is false/unprovable" yields his famous result on the limits of axiomatic reasoning. I'll contrast that with my work, which is based on the paradox of "The first uninteresting positive whole…

This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…

The fact that the famous Godel incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of logician community.…

According to Chaitin, G\"odel once told him "it doesn't matter which paradox you use [to prove the First Incompleteness Theorem]". In this paper I will present a few infinitary paradoxes and show how to "translate" them to some undecidable…

We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…

The fundamental proposal in this article is that logical formulas of the form (f <-> ~f) are not contradictions, and that formulas of the form (t <-> t) are not tautologies. Such formulas, wherever they appear in mathematics, are instead…

An ultimate universal theory -- a complete theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed -- has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and…

G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…

I present the proof of Goedel's First Incompleteness theorem in an intuitive manner, while covering all technically challenging steps. I present generalizations of Goedel's fixed point lemma to two-sentence and multi-sentence versions,…

We formulate a property $P$ on a class of relations on the natural numbers, and formulate a general theorem on $P$, from which we get as corollaries the insolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem, G\"odel's incompleteness theorem, and…

Most discussions of G\"odel's theorems fall into one of two types: either they emphasize perceived philosophical, cultural "meanings" of the theorems, and perhaps sketch some of the ideas of the proofs, usually relating G\"odel's proofs to…

We present a version of G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the derivability conditions. We also argue that…

It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…

Possibilistic logic, an extension of first-order logic, deals with uncertainty that can be estimated in terms of possibility and necessity measures. Syntactically, this means that a first-order formula is equipped with a possibility degree…

We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…