相关论文: A Dynamic Game Framework for Rational and Persiste…

Dynamic game theory is an increasingly popular tool for modeling multi-agent, e.g. human-robot, interactions. Game-theoretic models presume that each agent wishes to minimize a private cost function that depends on others' actions. These…

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cyber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been proposed…

A common strategy for solving an unconstrained two-player Nash equilibrium problem with continuous variables is applying Newton's method to the system of nonlinear equations obtained by the corresponding first-order necessary optimality…

In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations…

Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…

We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…

We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…

Algorithm design and analysis is a cornerstone of computer science, but it confronts a major challenge. Proving an algorithm's performance guarantee across all inputs has traditionally required extensive and often error-prone human effort.…

In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network,…

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…

Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1…

We study a class of two-player competitive concurrent stochastic games on graphs with reachability objectives. Specifically, player 1 aims to reach a subset $F_1$ of game states, and player 2 aims to reach a subset $F_2$ of game states…

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…

Dynamic games can be an effective approach to modeling interactive behavior between multiple non-cooperative agents and they provide a theoretical framework for simultaneous prediction and control in such scenarios. In this work, we propose…

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner's dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD…

In this paper, we consider the $n \times n$ two-payer zero-sum repeated game in which one player (player X) employs the popular Hedge (also called multiplicative weights update) learning algorithm while the other player (player Y) adopts…

A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…