相关论文: Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms fo…

We consider the challenge of finding a deterministic policy for a Markov decision process that uniformly (in all states) maximizes one reward subject to a probabilistic constraint over a different reward. Existing solutions do not fully…

The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…

Non-stationary online learning has drawn much attention in recent years. In particular, dynamic regret and adaptive regret are proposed as two principled performance measures for online convex optimization in non-stationary environments. To…

This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…

We model learning in a continuous-time Brownian setting where there is prior ambiguity. The associated model of preference values robustness and is time-consistent. It is applied to study optimal learning when the choice between actions can…

In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…

We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…

We study route choice in a repeated routing game where an uncertain state of nature determines link latency functions, and agents receive private route recommendation. The state is sampled in an i.i.d. manner in every round from a publicly…

Students' decisions on whether to take a class are strongly affected by whether their friends plan to take the class with them. A student may prefer to be assigned to a course they likes less, just to be with their friends, rather than…

Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

In a carsharing system, a fleet of cars is distributed at stations in an urban area, customers can take and return cars at any time and station. For operating such a system in a satisfactory way, the stations have to keep a good ratio…

In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…

This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…

Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…

We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…

We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and…

We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…