相关论文: Inference from Auction Prices
In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete…
I describe a method for estimating agents' perceived returns to investments that relies on cross-sectional data containing binary choices and prices, where prices may be imperfectly known to agents. This method identifies the scale of…
We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…
Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…
Real-time bidding (RTB) systems, which utilize auctions to allocate user impressions to competing advertisers, continue to enjoy success in digital advertising. Assessing the effectiveness of such advertising remains a challenge in research…
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
We investigate the effects of the social interactions of a finite set of agents on an equilibrium pricing mechanism. A derivative written on non-tradable underlyings is introduced to the market and priced in an equilibrium framework by…
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarchy takes a worst-case stance to efficiency analysis,…
This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the…
Standard models in economics stress the role of intelligent agents who maximize utility. However, there may be situations where, for some purposes, constraints imposed by market institutions dominate intelligent agent behavior. We use data…