相关论文: Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

Establishing the existence of exact or near Markov or stationary perfect Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Markov games over Borel spaces is a challenging problem with limited positive results. Motivated by problems in multi-agent and Bayesian…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

Cut games are among the most fundamental strategic games in algorithmic game theory. It is well-known that computing an exact pure Nash equilibrium in these games is PLS-hard, so research has focused on computing approximate equilibria. We…

We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…

Zero-sum stochastic games have found important applications in a variety of fields, from machine learning to economics. Work on this model has primarily focused on the computation of Nash equilibrium due to its effectiveness in solving…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of…

The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…

Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information pattern. A system of parabolic partial differential equations is obtained at the level of Hamiltonian to give the…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…