相关论文: Persistence probability of a random polynomial ari…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an epsilon-equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in non-randomized stopping…
A formalism is presented to obtain closed evolution equations for asymptotic probability distribution functions of turbulence magnitudes. The formalism is derived for a generic evolution equation, so that the final result can be easily…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
We model and study the genetic evolution and conservation of a population of diploid hermaphroditic organisms, evolving continuously in time and subject to resource competition. In the absence of mutations, the population follows a 3-type…
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…
Consider a discrete-time one-dimensional supercritical branching random walk. We study the probability that there exists an infinite ray in the branching random walk that always lies above the line of slope $\gamma-\epsilon$, where $\gamma$…
We consider a simple mathematical model of gradual Darwinian evolution in continuous time and continuous trait space, due to intraspecific competition for common resource in an asexually reproducing population in constant environment, while…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
We study selection acting on phenotype in a collection of agents playing local games lacking Nash equilibria. After each cycle one of the agents losing most games is replaced by a new agent with new random strategy and game partner. The…
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population…
We study the stability of randomized Taylor schemes for ODEs. We consider three notions of probabilistic stability: asymptotic stability, mean-square stability, and stability in probability. We prove fundamental properties of the…
We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…
We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis…
The probability that two randomly selected phylogenetic trees of the same size are isomorphic is found to be asymptotic to a decreasing exponential modulated by a polynomial factor. The number of symmetrical nodes in a random phylogenetic…
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by…
It is well-known that wave-type equations with memory, under appropriate assumptions on the memory kernel, are uniformly exponentially stable. On the other hand, time delay effects may destroy this behavior. Here, we consider the…
Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one's own…
In this paper we prove a stability result about the asymptotic dynamics of a perturbed nonautonomous evolution equation in $\mathbb{R}^n$ governed by a maximal monotone operator.
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…