相关论文: Corruption-free scheme of entering into contract: …

Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…

Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is drawn from an unknown distribution, and formalize an offline…

We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…

We study the problem of stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions in the cooperative multi-agent setting, where $V$ agents interact with a common $K$-armed bandit problem, and each pair of agents can communicate with each other to…

We study a setting where a set of agents engage in pairwise exchanges of freely replicable goods (e.g., digital goods such as data), where two agents grant each other a copy of a good they possess in exchange for a good they lack. Such…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

The indirect transactions between sectors of an economic system has been a long-standing open problem. There have been numerous attempts to conceptually define and mathematically formulate this notion in various other scientific fields in…

In cooperative Multi-Agent Planning (MAP), a set of goals has to be achieved by a set of agents. Independently of whether they perform a pre-assignment of goals to agents or they directly search for a solution without any goal assignment,…

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty…

We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an…

Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…

Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…

Real data are rarely pure. Hence the past half-century has seen great interest in robust estimation algorithms that perform well even when part of the data is corrupt. However, their vast majority approach optimal accuracy only when given a…

In this paper we extend the series of our studies on the properties of an interacting particle model for market microstructure. In our earlier work we defined a Markov process on the majority opinion of the agents, obtained the transition…

I study the limit of a large random economy, where a set of consumers invests in financial instruments engineered by banks, in order to optimize their future consumption. This exercise shows that, even in the ideal case of perfect…

This study simulates the evolution of artificial economies in order to understand the tax relevance of administrative boundaries in the quality of life of its citizens. The modeling involves the construction of a computational algorithm,…

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

Traditional notions of production function do not consider the time dimension, appearing thus timeless and instantaneous. We propose an agent-based model accounting for the whole production side of the economy to unfold the production…

We propose a set of conservative models in which agents exchange wealth with a preference in the choice of interacting agents in different ways. The common feature in all the models is that the temporary values of financial status of agents…