相关论文: Corruption-free scheme of entering into contract: …

We investigate an agent-based model for the emergence of corruption in public contracts. There are two types of agents: business people and public servants. Both business people and public servants can adopt two strategies: corrupt or…

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a costly and unobservable action. When all of the model…

Corruption has been an important issue as it becomes obstacle to achieve the better and more efficient economic governmental system. The paper defines corruption in two ways, as state capture and administrative corruption to grasp the…

Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed…

We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative contracts even under the same…

Studying corruption presents unique challenges. Recent work in the spirit of computational social science exploits newly available data and methods to give a fresh perspective on this important topic. In this chapter we highlight some of…

Lattice investment projects support process model with corruption is formulated and analyzed. The model is based on the Ising lattice model of ferromagnetic but takes deal with the social phenomenon. Set of corruption agents is considered.…

Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…

In supervised learning one wishes to identify a pattern present in a joint distribution $P$, of instances, label pairs, by providing a function $f$ from instances to labels that has low risk $\mathbb{E}_{P}\ell(y,f(x))$. To do so, the…

We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…

This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…

We use methods from network science to analyze corruption risk in a large administrative dataset of over 4 million public procurement contracts from European Union member states covering the years 2008-2016. By mapping procurement markets…

A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts -- known in economics…

Strategic argumentation provides a simple model of disputation and negotiation among agents. Although agents might be expected to act in our best interests, there is little that enforces such behaviour. (Maher, 2016) introduced a model of…

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…

We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…

This paper proposes the Potluck Problem as a model for the behavior of independent producers and consumers under standard economic assumptions, as a problem of resource allocation in a multi-agent system in which there is no explicit…

Corruption is notoriously widespread in data collection. Despite extensive research, the existing literature predominantly focuses on specific settings and learning scenarios, lacking a unified view of corruption modelization and…

We propose a simple market model where agents trade different types of products with each other by using money, relying only on local information. Value fluctuations of single products, combined with the condition of maximum profit in…

Large language models are increasingly proposed as autonomous agents for high-stakes public workflows, yet we lack systematic evidence about whether they would follow institutional rules when granted authority. We present evidence that…