相关论文: Corruption-free scheme of entering into contract: …

We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…

Consider sellers in a competitive market that use algorithms to adapt their prices from data that they collect. In such a context it is plausible that algorithms could arrive at prices that are higher than the competitive prices and this…

In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…

We investigate knowledge exchange among commercial organisations, the rationale behind it and its effects on the market. Knowledge exchange is known to be beneficial for industry, but in order to explain it, authors have used high level…

This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R\&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal…

We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly…

We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…

Auditors demand financial models be transparent yet no consensus exists on what that means precisely. Without a clear modeling transparency definition we cannot know when our models are "transparent". The financial modeling community…

We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…

We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…

I provide a sufficient condition under which a principal does not benefit from committing to a mechanism in economic models represented by a maximisation problem under constraints. These problems include mechanism design, principal-agent…

A simple computer simulation model of a closed market on a fixed network with free flow of goods and money is introduced. The model contains only two variables : the amount of goods and money beside the size of the system. An initially flat…

We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious…

Trading large volumes of a financial asset in order driven markets requires the use of algorithmic execution dividing the volume in many transactions in order to minimize costs due to market impact. A proper design of an optimal execution…

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…

The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…

This study investigates the prevention of market manipulation using a price-impact model of financial market trading as a linear system. First, I define a trading game between speculators such that they implement a manipulation trading…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly…

Corruption, fraud, and unethical activities have emerged as significant obstacles to global economic, political, and social progress. Although many empirical studies have focused on country-level corruption metrics, this study is the first…

We study optimal risk sharing among $n$ agents endowed with distortion risk measures. Our model includes market frictions that can either represent linear transaction costs or risk premia charged by a clearing house for the agents. Risk…